DevSecOps
SAST, SCA, secrets detection, SBOMs, policy as code and supply chain controls that run where the code is built.
Turn the SBOM from part 2 into a Cosign attestation bound to the image digest, verify it and read the predicate back, list what hangs off an image with cosign tree, and see what SLSA build provenance adds.
Run Syft from its container against a small Node.js image, read the CycloneDX output package by package, see where each one came from, learn what an SBOM does not prove, and store it next to the artifact.
One platform-owned GitLab CI template instead of a pipeline per repository: spec:inputs with validation, a consumer that includes it by project and tag, extension points, versioning, and what a consumer can override.
Grype against the SBOM from part 2: 183 matches read by severity, ecosystem and fix state; two Dockerfile changes that take it to 3; exit-code behaviour for CI; and how to triage what remains.
The secrets lifecycle for a cloud workload: credentials recovered from image history and deleted layers, a build that leaves nothing behind, Secrets in etcd before and after encryption at rest, rotation, and Vault TTLs.
Cosign with a key pair against a local registry: why the digest is the identity; signing and verifying; a moved tag failing verification while the digest passes; keyless signing as configuration; where the check goes.
The delivery chain from source through dependencies, build, artifact, image, registry and deployment; where each link can be compromised; and the control for each, from lockfiles and SBOMs to signing by digest.
Build the same Go service as a single-stage image and as a multi-stage image on a distroless base, then compare size, package count, scanner findings and the user it runs as.
The GitLab pipeline that gated this site while it ran CI: frozen installs, parallel quality gates, Trivy with SAST and secret detection, artifact verification, and one deployment owner behind protected main.
Stop credentials from reaching Git: run Gitleaks in pre-commit hooks and CI, tune rules and allowlists, handle findings without leaking them further, and decide when history rewriting is worth it.
How Trivy finds OS and application vulnerabilities, secrets and misconfigurations in container images, how to make the results actionable, and how to wire it into CI without slowing builds down.
A declarative Jenkins pipeline with secrets scanning, SAST, image scanning and least-privilege credential handling — and the agent, plugin and Docker decisions that keep it that way.
Build a deliberately weak image, scan it with Trivy, and rebuild it until the gate for fixable HIGH and CRITICAL findings passes: current base, non-root user, patched packages, no pip in the runtime image.
Seed a repository with realistic fake secrets, catch them with Gitleaks in history and working-tree modes, ignore a confirmed false positive by fingerprint, and block the next one at commit time.
Produce CycloneDX and SPDX bills of materials for a container image without a Docker socket, scan the SBOM with Grype, gate on fixable findings only, and see why the SBOM is worth keeping after the release.
Signs and verifies container images, SBOMs and attestations.
Detects hard-coded secrets in Git history and working trees.
Vulnerability scanner for images, filesystems and SBOMs produced by Syft.
Centralised secrets management with dynamic, short-lived credentials.
Fast, pattern-based static analysis with thousands of community and security rules.
Generates SBOMs (CycloneDX, SPDX) from images, directories and archives.